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It has become almost commonplace to observe that in the decades following the Second World War non-international armed
conflicts have become more numerous than interstate armed conflicts.1 Of the armed conflicts which have occurred during this period, non-international wars accounted for approximately eighty
percent of the victims.' Most of these internal conflicts have occurred in developing countries. They include not only colonial and
post-colonial wars,$ but also the more traditional internal conflicts
such as authority conflicts, minority conflicts, and wars of secession.4 Western countries have been confronted with these latter
types of conflicts on a much smaller scale. However, they have
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presented here were developed by the authors over a period of time.
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1 2 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 673 (1968). But cf. Veuthy, Some Problems of HumanitarianLaw in Non-Inter-

national Conflicts and Guerilla Warfare, in 1 A TREATISE

ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

427 (1973).
' Forsythe, Legal Management of International War: The 1977 Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1978 AM. J. INT'L L. 272 [hereinafter cited as Forsythe].
3 According to article 1(4) of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
1949, these conflicts now have the status of internationalarmed conflicts. The present authors, however, share the position of those who consider this characterization to be artificial.
Although the conflicts referred to in article 1(4) are undoubtedly matters of international
concern, they nevertheless bear most of the factual characteristics of internal wars. F. KALSHOVEN, THE LAW OF WARFARE 16 (1973). See also Baxter, HumanitarianLaw or Humanitarian Politics? The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on HumanitarianLaw, 1975 HARv. INT'L L.
J. 1. But cf. 3 ANNALS OP INT'L STUD. 93 (1972).
1 Different classifications of internal wars have been suggested. See Veuthy, supra note 1,
at 428; R. OGLESBY, INTERNATIONAL WAR AND THE SEARCH FOR NORMATIVE ORDER 124 (1971).
See also Falk, InternationalLaw and the United States' Role in the Vietnam War, 75
YALE

L. J. 1122 (1966).

279

280

[Vol. 13:279

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

been faced with the emergence of another "conflict" situation
which some have characterized as a new form of warfare: terrorism.5 Although terrorism may be classified as a kind of "criminality,"6 some governments have used military or paramilitary machinery to combat terrorists.7 Another kind of conflict which has
arisen in the post-World War II era is internal disturbances in Socialist countries that lead the governments of these countries to
take exceptional measures.8
In all of these cases, incumbent governments have invariably
considered the "conflict" to be an exclusively domestic matter and,
therefore, outside the scope of international law. This position is in
conformity with traditional international law which leaves the
management of internal conflict to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
national authorities of the state on whose territory it occurs. Accordingly, insurgents are traditionally dealt with according to the
ordinary criminal law. Unlike soldiers belonging to foreign military
forces, they owe allegiance and are liable to the country against
which they have taken up arms. When captured, insurgents are
treated as common criminals and are not entitled to Prisoner of
War status under the Fourth 1949 Geneva Convention. 9 Except
where they could benefit from treatment as "political offenders,"
the punishment and penitentiary treatment of insurgents as common criminals will usually be much harsher than their treatment
as military personnel. 10 Some countries have issued extraordinary
penal legislation which may apply to insurgents. An example is the
anti-terrorist legislation issued in some Western European coun-

5See generally B. JENKINS, INTERNATIONAL

TERRORISM:

A

NEW MODE OF CONFLICT (1975).

See also High Technology Terrorism and Surrogate War: The Impact of New Technology
on Low-level Violence, THE RAND PAPER SERIES, No. P-5541 (1975). See also G. SCHAMIS,
WAR AND TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (1980).
4 The "criminal" character of certain acts of terrorism has been debated at length, inter
alia by reference to their qualification as acts of war or as political offenses under extradition law. For a discussion of the different arguments, see David, Le Terrorisme en Droit
International,in REFLEXION SUR LA D9FINITION ET LA REPRESSION DU TERRORISME 114 (1974).
C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION: THE DELICATE
PROBLEM OF BALANCING

BETWEEN THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL

PUBLIC ORDER 154 (1980) [hereinafter cited as C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT]. See also Ferencz,
When One Person's Terrorism is Another Person's Heroism, 9 HUM. RTS. 39-43 (1981).
7 For example, the raids at Entebbe by Israeli commandos and at Mogadishu by the
West-German paramilitary unit CGS 9.
8 A non-armed variant of internal conflicts in some Socialist countries is the opposition of
the incumbent government to so-called dissidents.
9 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
o See C. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, supra note 6, at 29.
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tries within the past few years." Non-penal measures also may be
used to neutralize internal political opponents. 2 In extreme cases,
where a certain threshold of internal disorder is reached, the constitution may be suspended and martial law proclaimed.
While domestic law, in principle, governs the right of incumbent
governments to defend themselves against insurgents, international law has increasingly tended to interfere with this kind of
conflict management. Although theoretically the United Nations is
primarily concerned with the prevention and peaceful settlement
of international armed conflicts, it has shown a preoccupation with
domestic conflicts as well. The idea that there should be a minimum standard of ethics in both national and international politics
has led to an increased emphasis on two branches of international
law: human rights and humanitarian law. Because of the Charter's
emphasis on the necessity of respect for human rights to the preservation of international peace and security," human rights have
ceased to be a matter of exclusive domestic concern.' 4 There has
been "a growing awareness that even the archetypal 'internal affair' of the State, viz., the treatment of its own subjects, may under
certain circumstances become a legitimate concern of the international community."' 5 Nevertheless, these ideas have been transformed into positive international law only to a very limited extent. While many governments have been willing to declare their
support for the application of human rights principles to internal
conflicts, the support has lagged when it came to further specifying
those principles and laying them down in international instruments subject to signature and ratification. Consequently, a rather
ambiguous situation has developed in which provisions in interna-

" France, Greece, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy are among the countries that
have recently "sharpened up" their penal laws for dealing with terrorists. See C. VAN DEN
WIJNGAERT, supra note 6. See also Bonifacio, Limitation des Droits Individuels Dans la
Lutte Contre le Terrorisme, in Conseil de l'Europe, Conffrence sur Ia Dfense de la
Democratie Contre le Terrorisme en Europe: Thches et Problbmes, AS/Pol. Coll/Terr. (32),
at 4 (1980).
12 These measures include the use of psychiatric treatment to compel the resocialization
of political dissidents. Cf. Van Den Wijngaert, Repressive Violence: A Legal Perspective, in
REPRESSION AND REP'smsivE VIOLENCE 51 (1977); DeMeeus, Psychiatrie Repressive et S6questrations Arbitraires, in LA PROPHYLAXIE DU TERRORISME ETUDES INTERNATIONALES DE
PSYCHOSOCIOLOGIE CRIMINELLE 30 (1972).
13 U.N. CHARTER preamble.
14 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 740 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1965).
15Kalshoven, Reaffirmation and Development of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Applicable in Armed Conflicts: The Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1974-1977, 8 NETH. Y. B.
INT'L L. 109 (1977).
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tional human rights conventions or in humanitarian conventions
ostensibly contain a number of fundamental protections for victims of non-international armed conflicts. However, in reality the
protection granted is extremely restricted, either because the conditions for applying the rules are very severe or because there are
exceptions to the rules which leave the power of the incumbent
government to deal with domestic conflicts almost unaffected."'
Positive rules dealing with non-internal conflicts are laid down
in human rights law and humanitarian law. The 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,17 which now has the status of customary international law, has little practical value because of its
lack of precision and the absence of an effective international enforcement system. 18 The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,19 although it contains a number of precise rules
which could be applicable in non-international armed conflicts,
creates an enforcement mechanism;20 nevertheless, it has the drawback that most of the rights contained in it can be suspended in
time of public emergency threatening the life of the nation.2 ' Furthermore, the Covenant has only been ratified by a relatively small
number of states,22 most of which have not yet recognized the
Human Rights Committee's competence under article 41 of the
Covenant nor the right of individual application contained in the
Optional Protocol to the Covenant.13 Nevertheless, the Covenant's

"
'7
18

See infra text accompanying notes 19-21, 42-46.
G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR Resolutions Part 1 at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
David, Droits de 'Homme et Droit Humanitaire, in MLANGES FERDINAND DEHOUSSE

175 (1979).
" G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) thereinafter cited as Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].
o See id. arts. 28-45 (establishing the Human Rights Committee). The main task of this
committee is to control the application of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is
composed of 18 persons elected by the states who have signed the Covenant. The Covenant
itself does not provide for a right of individual application. This right was laid down in the
Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967). Individual applications can be lodged
with the Human Rights Committee. However, it does not give its opinion with respect to
possible violations of the Covenant, but only communicates its views to the state and the
individual concerned. The right to individual application can only be enforced against states

who have ratified the Optional Protocol. H.

ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD

41

(1972).
" Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 19, art. 4.
" As of June 1982, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had been
ratified or acceded to by 70 of the 157 members of the United Nations. 19 U.N. CHRON. June
1982, at 68.
" The following states have accepted the competence of the Human Rights Committee
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importance is its emphasis on those inalienable rights from which
no derogation may be made, not even in time of public emergency
threatening the life of the nation. These inalienable rights are: the
right to life, 24 the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, or de26
6
grading treatment or punishment, the prohibition of slavery,
the prohibition of imprisonment for inability to fulfill a contractual
obligation, 27 the presumption of innocence, 8 the right to be recognized as a person before the law, 29 and the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion.3 0 Unfortunately, the procedural
minimum rights contained in article 1481 have not been included
among the inalienable human rights.
The inalienable rights enumerated in the Covenant correspond
to a certain extent to those which have been included in common
article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.32 Since these
Conventions have been ratified by most of the member states of

under article 41: Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. The following states have ratified the Optional Protocol: Barbados, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Iceland, Italy, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mauritius, the Netherlands, Nicaragua,
Norway, Panama, Peru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Suriname, Sweden,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zaire. Id. at 69.
24 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 19, art. 6.
28 Id. art. 7.
Id.
Id.
I7
28 Id.
2o Id.
30 Id.
31

art.
art.
art.
art.

8(1)-(2).
11.
15.
16.

art. 18.

Id. art. 14.

32 According to article 3, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever when committed against protected persons: (a) violence to life
and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture; (b)
taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized people. Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, done
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter cited as Geneva
Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded,
Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention II]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention III); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter cited as Geneva
Convention IV].
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the United Nations,"s the "convention in miniature" contained in
common article 3,34 from the viewpoint of positive international
law, is of much greater importance than the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. The final redaction of common article 3, which
was the most debated of all the articles considered by the conference, 35 is a considerably weakened version of the original proposal
of the International Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.), which
contemplated the full application of the four Conventions to noninternational conflicts.3 6 Nevertheless, the article as it stands is an
enormous improvement. It has deprived incumbent governments of
the possibility of sheltering certain criminal acts and practices
under the veil of emergency domestic law. However, the effectiveness of common article 3 has been limited by the absence of precise guidelines for determining to which factual situations it applies. It refers to "non-international armed conflicts," but does not
define a threshold for its application in those conflicts. These and
other practical problems in applying common article 3 have been
abundantly commented upon during the past three decades.3 "
The 1977 Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions 8 was intended
to reaffirm and further develop the principles enshrined in common article 3.39 The frustration associated with the drafting of
Protocol II is an indication of the waning enthusiasm for, and in
the case of some states, outright opposition to it."0 The "convention in miniature" of 1949, which was revolutionary at that time,
would be even more revolutionary if drafted today. Many states
which subscribed to it in 1949 would probably no longer be willing
3 Of the 157 member states of the United Nations, 146 have ratified the four Geneva

Conventions of 1949.
3, See J. PICTET, COMMENTAIRE

SUR LA CONVENTION DE GENE,'

POUR L'AMikLIORATION DU

SORT DES BLESSEA El DES MALADES DES FORCES ARMkES EN CAMPAGNE 51 (1952) [hereinafter

cited as J. PicTET].
36 Gulbvandsen, A Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, in 1 M.
BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
" J. PICTET, supra note 34.

368, 373 (1973).

' For recent summaries of this discussion see Bothe, Conflits Arms, Internes et Droit
International Humanitaire, 1978 REVUE GENERAL DE DROIT INT'L PUBLIC 82 [hereinafter
cited as Bothe]; Forsythe, supra note 2, at 45; Kalshoven, supra note 15, at 107; Recent
Development, Law of War-Geneva Convention Signatories Clarify Applicability of Laws
of War in Internal Armed Conflict, 8 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 941 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Recent Development, Geneva Convention Signatories].
" Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Dec. 12, 1977, - U.N.T.S. -, reprinted
in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
39 Id. preamble.
40 See Kalshoven, supra note 15, at 110; Bothe, supra note 37, at 101.
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to accept it under present circumstances. Developing countries
have lost their interest in Protocol II since anti-colonial and antiracist wars have become accepted as international conflicts.4 1 They
have turned the originally proposed text of the I.C.R.C. into "a
document which, although moulded in the form of an international
instrument complete with a ratification procedure and all its trappings, bears a far closer resemblance to a non-binding declaration
of principles for non-international armed conflicts."4 The conditions of applicability of Protocol II are much more severe than
those of common article 3 of the 1949 Conventions. The threshold
for application is very high,' 8 and internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence, and
other acts of a similar nature are excluded." Although Protocol II
does not modify the existing conditions of application for common
article 3," many governments at the 1977 Diplomatic Conference
apparently read the conditions of application of Protocol II into
common article 3."4 If these conditions were read into common article 3, then Protocol II, although it contains several improvements
vis-A-vis common article 3,47 may well be a restriction rather than
an improvement. The importance of Protocol II as an instrument
of positive international law is likely to be very modest since many
states have expressed a hesitation about its acceptance, and consequently, the rate of ratification has been low' 8 (although this may
be a premature conclusion in view of the fact that the Protocol is
but five years old).
In the words of the Vatican, Protocol II may be termed a "gentlemen's embarassment" rather than a gentlemen's agreement, 9
because of the sharp differences between the views of the various
governments present at the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva, and
41

See Bathe, supra note 37, at 82; Bretton, Remarques Gnrales sur les Travaux de la

Conference de Geneve sur la Rkaffirmation et le D6veloppement du Droit International

Humanitaire Applicable Dans les Conflits Arms, 23 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DROIT INTERNATIONAL 197, 208 (1977). See also E. ROSENBLAD, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT 29 (1979).
42 Kalshoven, supra note
43
"
4.

15, at 115.
See Protocol II, supra note 38, art. 1(1).
Id. art. 1(2).
Id. art. I(I).

16 See Recent Development, Geneva Convention Signatories, supra note 29, at 949.
For a summary see Bothe, supra note 37, at 100.
48 The following states have ratified Protocol II: Bahamas, Bangladesh, Botswana, El Salvador, Equador, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Norway, Republic of Korea, and Switzerland.
49 See Forsythe, supra note 2, at 282.
4"
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the resulting impossibility of drafting general rules acceptable to
all states. In light of this difficulty in reaching an agreement on
acceptable rules, the question may be whether it is at all possible
to legislate internationally in this matter, and, concomitantly,
whether the formula of an international convention is the most appropriate technique for elaborating rules dealing with non-international armed conflicts. It has been suggested that a code for military action should be elaborated which will automatically apply
whenever military or paramilitary forces are called out to maintain
order, whether the conflict is national or international."0 Forsythe's
suggestion is consistent with the recent trend to draft codes of conduct in areas where compliance with norms is difficult to obtain
through the traditional conduit of international conventions. Recent examples are the different codes of conduct for transnational
enterprises 1 and the code of conduct for law enforcement officials.52 Just as the Declaration on Friendly Relations is used as a
guideline for state conduct, this kind of "soft law" could be used in
those situations where the conventional rules do not succeed because of an insufficient number of ratifications or the lack of compliance mechanisms. Unlike the formula used for the management
of non-international conflicts so far, namely international treaties,
the rules laid down in a code of conduct would not be legally binding. The obligation would be moral rather than legal compliance,
and this obligation would be sought through the so-called "mobilization of shame:" embarassing the government concerned by turning public opinion against it.
In practice, however, codes of conduct would probably be no
more effective in forcing compliance with recognized norms than
legally binding international treaties. The advantage would be that
states may be willing to accept norms established in a code of conduct that they would find difficult to adhere to were they established in a legally binding international treaty. The legal form of a
code of conduct for internal conflicts could be crucial to its effectiveness. If it were drafted as an international convention, subject

Id. at 295.
" See Sanders, The Implementation of InternationalCodes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 28 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 318-22 (1981).
" See Draft Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials: Note by the Secretary General, 32 U.N. GAOR Annex 2 (Agenda Item 80), U.N. Doc. A/32/138 (1977). See also Code
of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, 32 U.N. GAOR Annex 2 (Agenda Item 80), U.N.
Doc. A/32/138 annex (1977). The Draft Code was adopted by G.A. Res. 34/169, 34 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 185, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1980).
"
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to signature and ratification, then very likely it would be no more
satisfactory than Protocol II. If it were incorporated in a resolution
of the United Nations General Assembly, the substantive content
of the code could potentially be farther reaching than the norms
established in Protocol II. However, considering that the objections
to the originally proposed draft Protocol II were made primarily by
developing countries, which constitute the great majority of the
voting members of the General Assembly, it is very likely that a
General Assembly resolution adopting a code of conduct similar to
such a proposed draft would meet with similar objections.
Looking at the substantive content of the existing rules for the
protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts, i.e. the
prohibition of acts which under the national laws of most states
constitute the most serious crimes, the most appropriate enforcement for such rules appears to be penal enforcement. However,
taking into account the specific nature of internal conflicts, it is
very likely that only the actions of the insurgents will be punished,
while similar actions of the incumbent government will remain unsanctioned. The norms for the protection of victims of international conflict established in the 1949 Conventions and additional
Protocols require contracting parties to either prosecute or extradite persons accused of grave breaches of those norms.53 On the
other hand, violations of common article 3" are not given the status of grave breaches, and therefore, the contracting parties are
under no obligation to prosecute or extradite persons alleged to
have committed violations of the norms protecting victims of noninternational conflicts. However, the distinctions between grave
breaches having the status of international crimes and article 3 violations having no such status are largely theoretical. Prosecutions
and extraditions of persons accused of having committed grave
breaches of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions have been very
rare, 55 as have been prosecutions for article 3 violations committed
by the incumbent government." In view of the apparent reluctance

63 These grave breaches are defined in Geneva Convention I, supra note 32, art. 50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 32, art. 51; Geneva Convention III, supra note 32, art. 131;
and Geneva Convention IV, supra note 32, art. 147.
" These violations are largely identical to those defined as grave breaches in the four
1949 Geneva Conventions. Id.
C. VAN DEN WUNGAERT, supra note 6, at 146.
" See Roling, CriminalResponsibilityfor Violations of the Law of War, 12 REvUE BFLGE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL

8-26 (1976). Cf. Van Den Wijngaert & De Schutter, Terrorisme

Individuel et Terrorisme d'Etat: Une Diffsrence d'Analyse? in ACTaS

DES

XE JOURNfES
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to invoke this so-called indirect enforcement scheme whereby national mechanisms are used to enforce international norms,57 the
question inevitably arises whether it would not be more desirable
to have a direct international enforcement machinery for the investigation and prosecution of gross violations of humanitarian law.
Some experts have pleaded for the establishment of an international criminal court to handle this kind of case. 8 However, despite the numerous projects and scholarly proposals which have
been advanced on the subject during the past few years,5 9 it is

highly improbable that such a court will be established under the
present political circumstances. The international criminal court
contemplated by General Assembly Resolution 260 (III) B to deal
with the crimes listed in Resolution 260 (III) A, the Genocide Convention, was never created. Likewise, the penal court contemplated
in the Apartheid Convention has yet to be established."'
Since both the indirect and the direct enforcement systems are
unlikely to operate effectively, it is necessary to put more emphasis
on non-penal enforcement systems. Some experts have suggested
that the problem be approached from the standpoint of human
rights law, and that use be made of existing enforcement
machineries, which on the supranational level would be the Human
Rights Committee created by the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights."1 It is, however, difficult to see how this Committee as it stands could have any control upon internal conflict
management. First of all, the Committee can only consider applications of states, except in the very few instances where states
(1982).
" For an analysis of the different enforcement systems in international criminal law see
M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE 1-37
JEAN DUBIN

(1980) [hereinafter cited as M.

BASSIOUNI].

The Inter-Relationship Between Humanitarian Laws and the Law of
Human Rights in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMANITARIAN LAW
90 (1970); Robertson, Human Rights as the Basis of International HumanitarianLaw in
" McBride,

PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMANITARIAN LAW

71 (1970)

[hereinaf-

ter cited as Robertson].
69 One of the noteworthy efforts was that of the International Association of Penal Law
(I.A.P.L.), which promulgated a Draft International Criminal Code in which the creation of
an international criminal court is contemplated. The draft was prepared by the I.A.P.L.
secretary general, M. Bassiouni. See M. BASSZOUNI, supra note 57.
" A concrete proposal for an international criminal court under the Apartheid Convention was made by Bassiouni & Derby, Final Report on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court for the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant InternationalInstruments, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 525-92 (1981).
" Robertson, supra note 58, at 69-70.
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have accepted the right of individual application under the Optional Protocol. 2 The experience with the European human rights
system,6 which is similar to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, has been that application by states are made
very rarely, and even then, more for political than humanitarian
considerations." Furthermore, the possibility of condemning a
state for violations of inalienable human rights does not exist
under the International Covenant. One final obstacle to the use of
the enforcement mechanism of the International Covenant is that
the great majority of states have not accepted the competence of
the Human Rights Committee. 5
A more feasible proposal is suggested in the Declaration of San
Remo: "[Alt the very least, observance of the rules governing the
exercise of the rights of a protecting power (should) be improved
so as to allow injured parties direct access to an international authority, such as that represented by a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ... ."'I Admittedly, the task of such
a High Commissioner for Humanitarian Law would be far more
delicate than that of his colleague for Refugees. However, the emphasis of the High Commissioner would be more on preventing violations than on suppressing them or stigmatizing governments.
The High Commissioner, through his presence in the place where
the conflict occurs, might ensure stricter compliance with the rules,
and thus minimize the harm inflicted on each side. By gathering
information and reporting to political bodies, local and international, he might help the behavior of the parties. In fact, the role of
this High Commissioner when dealing with armed conflicts would
"'

See supra notes 20 and 23.
This system was established by the European Convention on Human Rights, which also
provides for the possibility of inter-state applications. See generally A. ROBERTSON, HUMAN
63

RIGHTS IN EUROPE

(1977).

" David, supra note 18, at 179. David submits, with respect to interstate applications
under the European Convention on Human Rights, that except for the applications lodged
against Greece by Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands beginning in 1967, all
other applications by states had strong political overtones and were incidental to a political
conflict between the states concerned. For example, the applications of Greece against the
United Kingdom in 1956-57 were linked to the problem of Cyprus; Ireland's application
against the United Kingdom in 1972 was linked to the Northern Irish conflict; likewise, the
application by Cyprus against Turkey in 1974-1975 was linked to the problem of the Turkish intervention.
6 See supra note 23.
e PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMANITARIAN LAW 19(3) (1970).
Cf. De Schutter, De Rol van de V.N. in Humanitaire Interventies, in 1 MISCELLANEA GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH 450 (1972).
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largely correspond to the role presently undertaken by the International Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.) and other humanitarian organizations. The difference would be that the High Commissioner, because of his omnipresence through the channel of his
local representatives, would be able to affect the behavior of the
parties in an early stage, before the conflict escalates to the level at
which states may otherwise be inclined to accept the assistance of
the I.C.R.C. Nevertheless, the question remains whether states
would be any less averse to a United Nations High Commissioner
than they presently are to the I.C.R.C., 67 which has a specific relief
role and does not accept any involvement in the political sphere of
the conflict, even though it sometimes expresses "discrete
indignation."
The survey made above may appear to be a rather pessimistic
one. The existing rules that tend to "humanize" non-international
armed conflicts are indeed few in number and small in scope. In
this respect, governments have shown a "selective humanitarianism"; 6s their willingness to accept rules restricting their power to
strike the enemy is limited to international conflicts and to colonial and post-colonial conflicts. Non-international conflicts have
remained within the realm of domestic law. International penal enforcement of the rules in question is non-existent, and non-penal
enforcement is still in an embryonic stage.
Nevertheless, these observations do not necessarily lead to an
overly pessimistic conclusion. As one author has observed, it is
very important to maintain a historical perspective on the growth
and development of human rights and humanitarian law.6" The few
rules that we have today were inconceivable several decades ago,
and the very fact that they exist has made domestic conflict management, yesterday's taboo, into a subject matter of current international critique, consideration, and concern.

' For a survey of the different positions of incumbent governments and insurgents with
respect to the assistance of the I.C.R.C. in internal conflicts during the past two decades, see
M. VEUTHY, GURILLA ET DRoIr HUMANITAIRE 49 (1977).
11 Forsythe, supra note 2, at 279-80.
10 Id. at 295.

